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I. Introduction
It has become nearly axiomatic (and even likely true) to hold that
inference generation during language comprehension is a function of two
things: (1) the nature of the inference under consideration and (2) the
conditions under which the inference is examined. Thus, in the first case,
we find the literature rife with observations that while there is little evi-
dence of "automatic" generation of certain "forward-looking" or "elabo-
rative" inferences (e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1981;
Singer & Ferreira, 1983), inferences involving certain likely causal conse-
quences may be "weakly generated" (e.g., Keenan, Baillet, & Brown,
1984; McKoon & Ratcliff,1986). Further, it has been observed that certain
"backward-looking" inferences such as bridging inferences or the infer-
ence linking an overt anaphor with its antecedent may be reliably and
automatically generated (Clark & Sengul, 1979; Corbett & Chang, 1983;
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1981, 1986). Indeed, the literature on text processing
details an amazingly variable array of different elaborative functions for
different "types" of inferences.
However, it has also been amply demonstrated that inference elabora-
tion appears to be a function of the conditions under which these infer-
ences were examined. Roughly speaking, this latter issue has three
aspects: the beliefs the listener or reader generates about the task to be
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performed in the experiment, the mode of perceptual presentation
(roughly, the encoding conditions), and the mode of response (recall,
recognition, automatic priming, etc).
A few of these aspects deserve some brief discussion. The basic issue to
be determined in the study of inference elaboration in natural language is
not one of whether or not some inference can be elaborated. Indeed, if one
can imagine an inference, then it is possible to generate it. Rather, the
basic issues are when (in the temporal course of comprehension) that
inference is elaborated, and what the processing results of that elaboration
are. Regarding the latter, one might be interested in the memorial conse-
quences of a generated inferences, or in the immediacy of availability of
that inference for use in problem solving, or some other such processing
result. Thus, it is important to consider these parameters in choosing the
response task. Probably the most obvious and important distinction to be
made in this regard is between tasks aimed at elucidating the perceptual
processing of inferences and those involved in demonstrating memorial
representation of inferences. The former situation calls for on-line, tempo-
rally immediate tasks whereas the latter requires tests of memory at appro-
priate temporal distances from the perceptual elaboration of the inference.
Similarly, just as issues concerning response mode are critical in the
study of inference processing, so is the issue of presentation (stimulus)
mode. Each presentation situation imposes its own strategies and limita-
tions on the examination of the inference process. As simply a single
example of the issue, a great deal of the current literature on inferences
involves the self-paced visual presentation of words (reading). This task
obviously has important contributions to make to the literature. However,
self-paced reading is a task that invites a number of special strategies on
the part of the subject. For example, because there is pressure in this task
to keep a rhythm going in button pressing, subjects in this task are often
pressing the "next-presentation" button before they have actually finished
reading a particular word or sentence. Similarly, this task allows for the
subject to pause in order to "mull" things over. While this behavior is, of
course, part of what can occur in reading, it is a process that mingles
problem-solving behavior with perceptual language processing. Certainly,
we know that one can elaborate an inference through problem-solving
techniques (by querying oneself about what something might mean, for
example). However, it is obviously important to consider whether such
cognitive, problem-solving processes are those one wishes to examine, or
whether something more focused on early "perceptual" processing is the
target of enquiry in one's study of inference generation.1
1Here, the term perceptual is used in the sense taken by Garrett (1979) and by Fodor
(1983). The term is not synonymous with traditional perceptual psychological usage which
implies that perceptual analysis is limited to the results of early, peripheral processing. NorInference Generation during Comprehension
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Finally, it is certainly a defensible position to hold that reading is a
process that is derivatively based upon the processing underlying normal
listening (see, e.g., Liberman, Shankweiler, Camp, Blackman, & Werfel-
man, 1980). Thus, if one is interested in the early stages of inference
processing (stages prior to cognitive problem solving, etc.), it will be
worthwhile to examine inference processing during auditory comprehen-
sion as well as during reading (which is the modality that essentially all of
the past and current literature has used in examining inference).
II. Perceptual and Cognitive Inferences: Toward a Typology of
Inference Generation
As argued previously, there are a wide variety of considerations and
issues to be dealt with in attempting to understand when and how we make
inferential elaborations during language comprehension. In what follows,
we will present a model aimed at elucidating some preliminary classes of
inference generation, classes that we feel differentiate the above issues in
important ways. Following that, we will provide an array of empirical
support for this classification.
The model identifies closely with Fodor's (1983) theory of mental modu-
larity. Based on this theory, we propose to make a first-cut differentiation
of inferences into two categories: perceptual and cognitive. Such a dis-
does it refer to processing that is noninferential, in the broad sense. Rather, it refers to initial
processing of a stimulus array (auditory or visual) that is both peripheral and inferential and
distinguished from other levels of processing in terms of the depth of cognitive abilities that
can be brought to bear on the process. In terms of sentence processing, for example,
perceptual processing is that early, superficial (yet inferential, in part) analysis of the sen-
tence that derives from lexical access, structural analysis, and combination of these into
simple logical form. The perceptual result of sentence processing is, thus, a superficial
analysis, not a fully elaborated one. See footnote 2.
2 Use of the terms perceptual and cognitive inference is, undoubtedly, going to generate
annoyance on the part of some readers. It is not done with that intent, however. The terms
have held different meanings throughout the history of psychology. Particularly, in the last
decade or so, much effort has gone into demonstrating that processes traditionally thought of
as "perceptual" have cognitive components. Our use here is not intended to refute that
position; indeed, much of what was classified as perceptual is influenced by cognitive factors
(whatever is meant by the two terms). However, we use the terms here in keeping with the
definitions that Fodor (1983) has introduced in distinguishing modular and nonmodular
processes. In that light, the terms do reflect definitionally and conceptually distinct
processes. We take that distinction to be a potentially profound one for psychological
examination, and hence we use the term perceptual i nstead of terms such as modular or
automatic or early, and the term cognitive instead of nonmodular or controlled or late, which
might be seen as alternative definitions. We feel these terms best capture the behavior we are
attempting to describe; namely, a first-pass, superficial, automatic, sentential analysis that is
equivalent to perceptual processing and a later, more "cognitive," problem-solving type
analysis that follows the earlier superficial one.20
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tinction allows for a differentiation of those inferences which are predicted
to be automatically, mandatorily, and immediately derived during the
on-line perceptual processing of language (perceptual inferences) and
those inferences which are never automatically or immediately derived
and which are under cognitive control (nonperceptual or cognitive infer-
ences). This distinction, then, is essentially that encompassed by Fodor's
(1983) distinction between encapsulated and nonencapsulated processes.
It is argued here that the class of perceptual inferences is necessarily a part
of the early perceptual, encapsulated processing of language. Such infer-
ences will have the qualities of (1) being independent of world knowledge,
intentions, and pragmatics and (2) being drawn mandatorily and immedi-
ately. By
 immediately we mean that the inference will be drawn as soon as
the licensing conditions for that inference are met (i.e., occurrence of the
perceptual stimuli which make the inference possible). Thus, even knowl-
edge that tells the processor that the inference is likely to be inappropriate
in a certain discourse condition is hypothesized to be unable to change the
immediate and mandatory elaboration of these perceptual inferences.
Therefore, perceptual inference elaboration is argued to occur immedi-
ately during comprehension, and not merely at the point of the test of
comprehension or at recall from memory.
Cognitive inferences, on the other hand, are those inferences which are
neither mandatory, automatic, or immediate. In fact, by definition, cogni-
tive inferences cannot be generated or elaborated immediately upon oc-
currence of potential licensing conditions. That is, even though informa-
tion capable of supporting a particular cognitive inference may appear in
the initial superficial perceptual analysis of a sentence, cognitive infer-
ences are not automatically elaborated. Rather, they are under the "cogni-
tive" control of strategies tied to world knowledge, statistical bias, and
pragmatic knowledge. Further, in the sense of Posner and Snyder (1975),
cognitive inferences are controlled as opposed to automatic. Thus, criter-
ially, cognitive inferences cannot be elaborated immediately. They are
taken to be entities beyond initial, first-order sentence analysis.
The distinctions we are proposing between perceptual and cognitive
inferences are distinguished theoretically by virtue of their amenability to
influence by world knowledge (or, alternatively, their information encap-
sulation) and the automaticity with which the inference may be generated
during ongoing comprehension. Empirically, the two classes of inference
differentiate on the basis of the temporal characteristics of their elabora-
tion. Perceptual inferences are those that will be elaborated as soon as the
licensing conditions are encountered by the listener or reader, regardless
of whether certain pragmatic conditions counterindicate elaboration of
these inferences (see following sections for examples). Cognitive infer-
ences are those that will be shown not to be capable of being immediatelyInference Generation during Comprehension
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elaborated upon occurrence of licensing conditions, regardless of how
favorable the pragmatic conditions (world knowledge, likelihood, etc.) are
for the immediate elaboration of these inferences.
We propose that the class of inferences we have labeled as perceptual
constitutes a limited set. Specifically, we hypothesize that perceptual
inferences constitute a subset of those inferences involved in establishing
coreference during language comprehension: explicit and implicit anapho-
ric elements. Future research and theory may eventually support the
existence of other members of this class, but at this point we know of no
others. Is the following section we will present empirical evidence that
shows these, but not other, inferences to be mandatory, immediate, and
uninfluenced by world knowledge.
Cognitive inferences, on the other hand, involve the majority of those
inference types which have been studied in the literature under the labels
predictive, causal, schema-related, metaphorical, and so on. By and large,
the reason that researchers have found these inferences to be unreliably
generated in various studies is, we argue, because these inferences are not
mandatory, automatic, or immediate, but rather are under cognitive con-
trol, are constrained by world knowledge, pragmatics, and estimates of
probability, and thus cannot be immediately, or universally, generated.
Again, in what follows, we provide several pieces of empirical evidence
examining these inferential processes.
III. Empirical Evidence for the Distinction between Perceptual and
Cognitive Inferences
A. PERCEPTUAL INFERENCES
In what follows, we sketch a number of experiments demonstrating the
properties of perceptual inferences, providing more detailed evidence for a
few of the more surprising examples of this inference type.
First, as was suggested, an obvious candidate for a perceptual inference
is the process involved in establishing coreference for explicit pronominal
anaphors. A large number of investigators have looked at antecedent
assignment for pronouns and other anaphoric elements (e.g., Bever &
McElree, 1988; Corbett & Chang, 1983; Dell, McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1983).
In these studies, subjects were visually presented material containing
pronouns (or other anaphoric elements) with coreferents in an antecedent
position (earlier in the sentence). The findings of all studies indicated that
some antecedents (either one or several) are activated relatively quickly
upon the reader seeing the pronoun. In both the Corbett and Chang (1983)
and Bever and McElree (1988) studies, subjects appeared to have acti-22
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vated an antecedent to the pronoun by the end of the sentence containing
the pronoun. Dell et al. (1983) showed that 250 msec after reading an
anaphor (not a pronoun in this case) in a paced reading condition, some
sort of activation for the correct antecedent was evident. Thus, it appears
that the inference binding the antecedent to anaphoric elements (and, in
particular, pronouns) is made fairly quickly in controlled reading situa-
tions. However, while this certainly points strongly toward a claim that a
coreferent is bound (assigned) to the pronoun rapidly, these studies do not
demonstrate true immediately of coreference assignment. For this to be
demonstrated, it must be shown that such assignment is made immediately
upon occurrence of the licensing condition (the pronoun) in the sentence,
not just temporally "downstream" from it. A study reported in Swinney,
Ford, and Bresnan (in press) does, however, provide some finer-grained
evidence about the immediacy of inference generation in the case of
pronominal anaphora. We will describe it here in a fair amount of detail, as
the general experimental technique will be relevant to subsequent studies
in this article.
The Swinney et al. study involved the use of the cross-modal lexical
priming technique (see Swinney, Onifer, Prather, & Hirshkowitz, 1979) to
examine activation of potential coreferents for overt pronouns during
sentence comprehension. Subjects listen to auditorily presented sentences
containing overt pronouns with several prior possible antecedents. For
example, in this study, subjects heard sentences such as:
The boxer visited the doctor that the swimmer at the
competition had *
1 advised him *
2 to see about his injury.
Subjects were told that one of their tasks was to listen carefully to the
sentence and to understand it, and that they would be tested on their
comprehension during the experiment (and they were). Subjects were told
that they had a second task which they had to perform while listening to the
sentences: they would see a letter string appear on a CRT in front of them
and their job was to decide as quickly as they could whether or not the
letter string was a word (a lexical decision task). In the case of the experi-
mental (as opposed to control or filler) sentences, the letter strings were
presented visually at the numbered test points indicated in the example
sentence by asterisks during auditory presentation of the materials. The
words that were visually presented were the possible coreferents of the
pronoun (e.g., BOXER, DOCTOR, SWIMMER) or control words that
were matched for frequency, length, and a priori lexical decision time to
these targets but which were semantically unrelated to them. Thus, for the
experimental sentences, identity priming for each of these possible co-Inference Generation during Comprehension
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referents was examined. In all such experiments, any given subject was
only tested at one display point and with one target or control word.
Further, there were always sufficient filler materials (containing unrelated
targets) so that experimentally related target words occurred less than 20%
of the time throughout the experiment.
Thus, identity priming for lexical decision to the coreferent target (com-
pared to matched controls) was used as a measure of activation of the
antecedent at the particular point in the sentence at which the probe was
presented.3  The first target presentation point in the sentence (after the
auxiliary verb) was used as a baseline, to determine the activation of each
of the possible coreferents prior to the pronoun. Comparison of activation
at the baseline to amount of activation (priming) at the second target
presentation point (immediately after the pronoun) provides a measure of
immediate activation of appropriate and inappropriate coreferents by the
pronoun. Thus, this design provides a more direct test of the immediacy of
inference generation for pronouns than some of the prior studies have been
able to, as it tests at the point where such inference is first licensed-that
is, immediately after the pronoun. The results for this study can be seen in
Table I. The appropriate referent to the pronoun (BOXER) was the only
item that demonstrated significant priming compared to its control at test
point 2 (after the pronoun) and a significant increase in priming between
test point 1 (baseline) and test point 2. Thus, this study provides direct
evidence that the pronoun immediately activates its antecedent during
comprehension. It also turns out that this evidence suggests that only the
correct antecedent is activated and that this process may be guided by
linguistic knowledge. That is, it was not simply the most recent possible
antecedent or even all possible antecedents that were activated. Instead,
only the one that was syntactically free to be an antecedent of the pronoun
was activated. However, this is a complicated argument and one not
directly relevant to the issue at hand, In all, overt pronouns act in a manner
in keeping with the definition of a perceptual inference; they immediately
activated their coreferents via inference generation.
3 It is worth noting briefly that although there has been some interesting discussion of the
effects of backward priming in the use of cross-modal lexical decision tasks (see Glucksberg,
Kreuz, & Rho, 1987) this argument cannot apply to the case here. In the first place, research
by Burgess, Tanenhaus, and Seidenberg (1989) and by Prather and Swinney (1988) has
demonstrated that the backward priming effect, as argued by Glucksberg et at., does not hold
up in accounting for cross-modal priming work. Further, in this particular case, backward
priming, even if it could have accounted for prior work, cannot account for results under this
current paradigm, because there is nothing to backward prime from in these cases. That is,
the pronoun is not a source of information as to what to activate. Quite to the contrary, the
pronoun is itself seeking information about what to activate.24
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As suggested earlier, this result may not seem very surprising given the
prior literature. It simply validates the claim for immediacy in this type of
inference generation. However, in the studies we present immediately
below, we provide evidence that supports a more surprising type of
anaphoric relation also to be a case of perceptual inference generation:
those involving the implicit (nonovert) anaphoric conditions found in
filler-gap constructions.
Linguistic "gaps" are phonetically empty linguistic constructs created
by movement (in the cases we will examine here) of object noun phrases in
relative clauses. Thus, for example, in the sentence
That is the cat that the dog chased (t).
the (t) marks a type of gap that is called a trace. This trace is phonologically
empty (that is, it is not phonologically realized) and it indicates that the
direct object of the verb chasedwas moved from this t position forward to
the matrix (main) clause in the sentence. (The underlying relative clause is
taken to be, in its "deep" form, The dog chased the cat; thus, when cat
was moved to the matrix clause, it left behind a trace.) This is simply one
example of a sentence with a linguistic gap. Such gap constructions are
interesting because, by linguistic standards, they are cases of implicit
anaphoric relationships. Any processing account of language comprehen-
sion must account for how the antecedent of this implicit anaphor (in this
example, cat) is linked to the trace. This gap-filling process is, thus, a case
that is similar in some respects to the case of overt pronouns. However,
here the marker of the anaphoric relationship t (what we have called the
licensing condition for the inference) is simply not overtly produced for the
TABLE I
INFERENCE PROCESSING:
OVERT PRONOUNSa
Test point
Visual
targets
	
1
	
2
Boxer 23 51*
Doctor 32 42*
Swimmer
	
9
	
20
aLexical decision results are given as priming
(control minus experimental) reaction times in msec
to items presented at different sentential test points.
* p < .05.Inference Generation during Comprehension
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comprehender to see or hear. However, it is a function of the verb
preceding it. That is, the verb (in our example, chased) requires a direct
object. It turns out that the direct object has occurred early in the sentence
(and is so marked by the relative pronoun that). Thus, the question rele-
vant to inference generation is: Will the verb license an inferential process
in which the antecedent to the implicit anaphoric element (the trace or gap)
is immediately determined? Or, put another way, will any verb requiring a
direct object (transitive verbs) license perceptual inferential processing to
determine that direct object?
Two experiments by Swinney, Ford, Frauenfelder, and Bresnan re-
ported in Swinney et al. (in press) directly addressed that question. In
both, the results support the argument that appropriate perceptual infer-
ences are made immediately upon occurrence of an inference licensing
condition for a gap in a sentence. In these studies, subjects heard sen-
tences such as:
The policeman saw the boy that the crowd at the party *1
accused (t) *2 of the crime .
Lexical decisions were made to words related to either boy (e.g., GIRL) or
crowd (e.g. GROUP) or appropriate, semantically unrelated control
words. Priming for these items was examined at test point I (baseline,
before the verb) and test point 2 (at the gap). The results are provided in
Table II. As can be seen, although group (which had just been heard in the
sentence) was significantly primed before the verb, all priming disappeared
after the verb had been heard and the gap was reached. This, suggests that
crowd was not accessed or activated as the antecedent of the trace in this
sentence. However, even though a target word related to the correct
antecedent of the gap (boy) was not significantly primed at test point 1
before the verb, it was significantly primed at the gap. This evidence
strongly supports the notion that a mandatory, immediate, perceptual
inference has been made at this point as to the appropriate antecedent of
the trace (boy).
The same materials were used in a second study using a naming tech-
nique rather than the lexical-decision technique in a cross-modal priming
paradigm.
4 The experiment was essentially identical to the previous one,
except that a naming task was used. The words POLICEMAN, BOY, or
CROWD appeared at the two test points and the time to say these words at
each test point was measured. Priming was measured by subtracting reac-
4 The reasons for this address claims in the literature concerning the relative sensitivity of
lexical decision and naming paradigms to various processing properties.26
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TABLE II
INFERENTIAL PROCESSING:
COREFERENCE IN FILLER-GAP
CONDITIONS
Experiment 1a
Target related to
	
1
	
2
	
Experiment 2b
Policeman
	
- -
	
6
Boy
	
12
	
27*
	
-29*
Crowd
	
44*
	
8
	
-5
aLexical decision values are priming (control mi-
nus experimental) reaction times in msec to seman-
tically related words at sentential test points. I and
2 refer to test points.
bNaming values are the difference in msec be-
tween reaction time to naming the following words
at sentential test points.
*p < .01.
Lion time to name a target word at test point I from that to name it at test
point 2 (averaged across subjects, of course, since no one subject saw the
same word at more than one point). These priming scores are displayed in
the right side of Table II. As can be seen, these results replicate those of
the first study. Priming was immediately evident for (only) the appropriate
antecedent of the trace, again supporting the conclusion that this gap-
filling process for these implicit anaphoric elements is a case of perceptual
inference processing.
These studies provide evidence of the immediate nature of these infer-
ences. Additionally, they point up the mandatory nature of these infer-
ences, given that there is nothing overt forcing the inference to occur in the
case of the gap-filling studies. However, there is another property of
perceptual inference processing that we have proposed-independence
from effects of plausibility, pragmatics, or world knowledge. Although the
range of studies necessary to fully examine this issue is enormous, we have
begun a number of experiments aimed at precisely this issue. We will
present just the first in this line of research. In this study, the likelihood of a
particular agent (actor) performing an act was set in strong opposition to
the appropriate antecedent for a trace in a gap-filling situation. Thus, we
were looking to see if pragmatic information would cause the gap to be
filled with the pragmatically appropriate but syntactically inappropriateInference Generation during Comprehension
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antecedent, or whether the gap-filling procedure truly takes place inde-
pendently of world knowledge. For example, subjects heard sentences
such as:
Everyone watched the enormous heavyweight boxer that the
small 12-year old boy on the corner had * beaten (t) * so brutally.
Here, the syntactically appropriate antecedent of the gap is boxer (i.e., it is
the boxer who is being beaten), although pragmatics suggests that this is an
unlikely event. Naming scores for BOXER and BOY were collected at
both the point immediately before the critical main verb (e.g., after the
auxiliary verb had in the above example) and the point after the critical
main verb. The preliminary results are uniform and unequivocal in their
interpretation. Significant priming is always found for naming times to
BOXER after the verb, but those for BOY show nonsignificant effects.
Thus, only boxer is inferentially generated as the appropriate antecedent
to the trace. In short, at least in this case, the likelihood of who would be
beaten in a contest between a 12-year-old boy and a boxer is ignored by the
inferential process which is determining the antecedent to the trace. While
it is certainly true that this preliminary experiment does not prove that all
perceptual inferences are immune to all world-knowledge or plausibility
effects, it does strongly suggest that they may be independent in precisely
the manner argued previously.
B. COGNITIVE INFERENCES
However interesting or compelling one finds the case for perceptual
inferences to be, in order to make the case for the perceptual/cognitive
inference distinction it is necessary to demonstrate evidence that some
inferences have the characteristics claimed to be associated with cognitive
inferences. The major such characteristic is that they cannot be immedi-
ately derived.
Even though the discourse-inference literature is filled with claims of
inference elaboration for an enormous array of inference types, there have
been very few claims of elaboration of these inferences prior to experimen-
tal query about these inferences (see, e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983, McKoon
& Ratcliff, 1986, for reviews of this literature) and even fewer experimen-
tal results that could be taken as support for immediate inference genera-
tion. Indeed, even in the cases for which researchers have suggested that
automatic inference generation is most likely (e.g., those involving
schema, forward inferences, and causal inferences) there is no evidence28
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that unequivocally establishes that they are elaborated immediately in the
sense of the perceptual inferences discussed previously. Part of the prob-
lem is methodological. Much of the literature has not utilized on-line tasks
which can determine immediate activation. Further, those studies employ-
ing tasks that do have the ability to detect immediate activation (e.g.,
McKoon & Ratcliff's deadline procedure) seem to have failed to demon-
strate immediate inference generation (that is, generation of an inference
immediately upon occurrence of licensing conditions for that inference).
For example, McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) have argued that even in cases
involving extremely high likelihood (highly predictable outcomes) in cau-
sal events, they find that the inferences are, at best, only weakly encoded
into memory.
In what follows, we briefly present a number of studies involving a range
of inferences that have been thought to be good candidates for immediate,
automatic activation of inferences. In each case we have used sensitive
on-line experimental tasks that are capable of detecting activation of the
inference and we have made conditions as favorable as possible for occur-
rence of the inference. In each case, we find that the inference is not
activated immediately upon occurrence of the licensing conditions, but is
only activated a short time later (if at all), depending on the nature of the
context and processing conditions. These inferential types include those
involved in metaphor processing, presuppositional processing, and
schema-based instrument activation.
In the first, the processing of metaphors was examined with a cross-
modal priming task to determine, when activation of literal and metaphoric
meanings takes place during normal sentence processing (Swinney, 1981).
In this experiment, subjects heard definitional metaphors (e.g., The sky
was a fire.) in a sentential context. Thus, for example, subjects heard the
sentence:
Jeff told his friend that Mary's hair was * honey * and her *
smile gleamed.
At each of the three test points, subjects were primed for words semanti-
cally related to the literal or the metaphoric meaning of the metaphor (hair
was honey). In this case the words BEE and BLOND were used, along
with appropriate control words. The basic issue is one of whether the
metaphoric interpretation (the inference) was activated immediately upon
encountering the licensing condition for the inference (the end of the
metaphor). Table III presents the data from this experiment. As shown in
the table, there is no priming (inferential activation) of the metaphorical
interpretation until nearly 500 msec (the third test point) after the end ofInference Generation during Comprehension
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TABLE III
INFERENTIAL PROCESSING:
DEFINITIONAL METAPHORSa
Test point
Target
	
1
	
2
	
3
Bee
	
-4
	
32*
	
15
Blond
	
26*
	
9
	
35*
aLexical decision results are given as amount of
priming (control minus experimental) reaction
times in msec.
* p < .05.
the metaphor. Importantly, this pattern of results was replicated in a
situation in which all materials in the experiment were metaphors. Thus, in
this condition, subjects knew that they would be getting tested on meta-
phors and that they should make metaphor inferences in each of these
sentences. However, this pragmatic situational knowledge did not change
the basic results: no immediate activation of the inference took place. (It
should be noted that a 500-msec delay in processing is an enormous
amount of processing time and safely takes this out of the realm of being a
perceptual inference.)
The second case we will describe is one involving the perceptual conse-
quences of presuppositions. In this work (Cutler & Swinney, 1978), factive
verbs were contrasted with nonfactive verbs to examine the elaboration or
activation of the (inferentially) presupposed information. (Factive verbs,
such as the verb to know in the sentence I know how old 1 am presuppose
something to be a fact.) Thus, subjects heard sentences of the following
general nature:
The death-penalty requirement that the young lawyer knew
applied to this case was discussed thoroughly.
In this study, the subjects' task was to detect when some word in the
sentence began with the "uh" sound (as in the word applied). This pho-
neme monitoring task has been shown (Foss, 1970) to be sensitive to
increases or decreases in processing load. If the occurrence of the factive
verb knew causes activation of the presupposed information that was
implied by that verb, then it should cause increased processing load and
hence increased reaction time for the detection of the target phoneme.30
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(This condition in the example above is compared to that for the same
sentence with the control verb thought, which is not a presuppositional
verb.) The results demonstrated no immediate increase in processing load.
Any effect of the factive verb (presuppositional inference) must have
occurred following the inference licensing condition.
Finally we present evidence concerning the activation of instrumental
inferences in schema contexts. Despite early claims in the literature'that
instruments are routinely inferred during reading (e.g., Paris & Lindauer,
1976), work by Corbett and Dosher (1978) convincingly demonstrated that
this earlier work was not adequate evidence of inference elaboration dur-
ing comprehension, must less at point of recall. In a careful study they
demonstrated that implicit (unstated) instruments are "not routinely in-
ferred in comprehension." Similarly, work by McKoon and Ratcliff (1981)
did not find routine instrumental inference generation. Their results sug-
gested that an inference might be generated in the case of instruments
highly semantically related to the verb that appeared in the sentence, but
this evidence did not support a claim that they were immediately activated,
in the sense of immediacy we have been talking about, even for semanti-
cally related instruments. Thus, in order to gather data that could better
address the immediacy hypothesis, we used a cross-modal priming task in
which we tested for the generation of inferences about instruments in the
presence of a well-established schema. In this experiment, subjects heard
either the schema-inducing context sentence or its control, followed by the
test sentence. For example, subjects heard either (1 a) or (Ib):
(1) a. John sat down to eat his meal that evening.  *
[schema-inducing context]
b. John sat down in his normal chair that evening. *
[control context]
Following that they heard the continuation sentence (2):
(2) He cut the juicy meat * and began eating his dinner.
Sentences (la) [or (lb)] and (2) were presented together, as in normal
discourse. Priming for the possible instrument (in this case, KNIFE, a
basic instrument in eating a meal) or the control for that word (in this case
the word FRAME) was examined at the two points indicated by the
asterisk. The first test point was used to determine whether the instrument
would be activated by the licensing condition (in this case, the schema-
inducing context eat his meal). The second test point was used to deter-
mine whether the schema was activated later, perhaps as a result ofInference Generation during Comprehension
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TABLE IV
EXAMINATION OF INSTRUMENT
ACTIVATION IN STRONG SCHEMA
CONTEXTSa
Test point
Context
	
1
	
2
Schema
	
18
	
43*
Control
	
5
	
17
aLexical decisions (magnitude of priming in
msec) to inferred instrument or control word (e.g..
knife, frame).
* p <.03.
cognitive inference generation in the case involving a schema-inducing
context. The results are presented in Table IV. As can be seen by inspec-
tion, there is no evidence of instrument inference generation at the licens-
ing point (test point 1). However, in the schema-generating context condi-
tion only, there is evidence of instrument activation considerably
downstream (later in time) from that context (test point 2) Recently, we
have replicated these results with a naming test.
5 In sum, there is evidence
that an instrumental inference might be eventually generated in a sentence
with appropriate plausibility conditions (here, the schema condition), but
it is not immediately, mandatorily, or autonomously activated by the
inference-licensing conditions. Thus, again, we have evidence of a contex-
tually malleable, cognitive inference process.
IV.  Summary
In summary, we have presented evidence which supports a distinction
between two classes of inferences, those that are generated mandatorily,
automatically, and immediately (which we have called perceptual infer-
ences) and those which cannot be generated immediately during percep-
tual processing, but which are generable under the influence of plausibil-
ity, world knowledge, and pragmatics (cognitive inferences). We have
5 It is worth noting that, in this respect, our results differ from those of Potts, Keenan, and
Golding (1988), who found differences in sensitivity between lexical decision and naming
tests for highly predictable events.32
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identified the former type of inference with early, perceptual, encapsu-
lated, modular stimulus processing and the latter with later-occurring,
cognitively driven analysis. The challenge for future empirical work on
this issue is to identify and delineate further the types of inferences and the
conditions of generation for those inferences that may further distinguish
the classes of processes we have discussed here.
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